We have been building encryption service for a while. I grew up in the world of encryption and many things just came with experience, without being spelled out. Here’s another why I believe in “hardware encryption”.
As the core technology of Enigma Bridge had been in its cloud encryption platform, there was always a question whether we wanted to keep use-cases of this technology under the same company. This thinking resulted in a decision to create a spin-off. This was executed in January 2018 and resulted in funding of Radical Prime Limited.
KeyChest HTTPS monitoring started small – to help us manage our certificates and its free service grew with interest. It’s the right approach from the business point of view, but it has its dark side. A major incident flashed it out last Saturday.
If you want to see raised eyebrows, just say “unbreakable crypto”. Yet everyone assumes their use of crypto is “unbreakable”. Security experts know it’s safe to reject “unbreakable systems” out of hand, but they often rely on the unbreakability of security protocols day in, day out.
I wrote about the ROCA vulnerability yesterday. It affects Infineon security chips used in TPMs and smart cards. While it is easy to identify TPM modules and computers using them, smart cards are more difficult.
Looking back, we can find many examples of errors in the algorithms used to create encryption keys. Not very many of them, however, were found in chips designed and sold as high-security devices for email signing, verifying software integrity, VPN access, or citizen e-ID cards.
We have compiled all practical information we could find and written it up at Numbers you need to know. It’s a long list of restrictions, rate limits, and other useful information to keep in mind. Here’s a few selected points that we found interesting. Big thanks to schoen from Certbot/EFF for pointing out numerous inaccuracies.
A team of great people from the Security Group at UCL and our start-up Enigma Bridge designed and implemented a practical security system tolerant to severe attacks compromising all parts of the supply chain. We will present and demonstrate it at DEFCON in Las Vegas.
Is it really possible to design an encryption system, which is as strong as its strongest link? There is never a straight “yes” answer to this question, but we are now as close as one can get.